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RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.
The right of stoppage in transitu is a necessary and equitable
concomitant of a credit system.
It may be defined to be the right which the unpaid vendor has to
repossess himself of his goods before they come into the actual or
constructive possession of his insolvent transferree.
As there has been much controversy as to the origin of this
right, it may be as well to discover, if possible, the source whence
it is derived, and to notice its gradual development.
In the early history of man all tranfers of property, being by
way of barter, were cash transactions; but the advancement of the
arts and sciences, as well as the progress of commerce, soon rendered a credit system necessary; and to the credit system we are
indebted for our laws of exchange, usury, bankruptcy, lien, and
among others, of stoppage in transitu.
When a vendor sells a parcel of goods upon credit, and before
they come into possession of his vendee, learns that he is likely to
lose nearly their whole value, he will naturally use his utmost
endeavors to regain the possession of them; and it would be
strange if the law did not assist him.
By the civil law we find it declared: "Qu e d vendidi non aliter
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fit accipientis, quam si aut pretium nobis solutum sit, aut satis es
nomine factum, vel etiam fidem habuerimus emptori sine ullA
satisfactione."I And the civil law allowed the vendor even after
delivery, and even in the bands of a bonq fide sub-purchaser, to
seize his goods if unpaid for, unless express or implied credit had
been given.
Upon the authority of this rule, some of the governments of
Europe have allowed the unpaid vendor to take his goods from the
possession of the insolvent vendee when sufficiently identifyable.
Thus in Domat: "The seller who has sold anything and still lies
out of the money which he was to have for it, if he finds the thing
he sold in the hands of the buyer, may seize on it, and he is not
obliged to share it with the other creditors of the buyer. ' 2 And
from the same author we learn,3 that in some of the provinces of
France, if a thing had been sold on terms of prompt payment, the
seller could have claimed it even from the hands of a third person,
who had purchased it bong fide from the buyer, the property not
being considered to have passed from the hands of the original
vendor.
The framers of the Code Napoleon, after an investigation into
the merits of the civil law system, and that of England, gave the
preference to the latter. The reasons for this change are thus
explained in the "Discours des Orateurs du Gouvernement:" "The
framers of the plan of a Code of Commerce had demanded the
abolition of the law of revendication, as contrary to the interests
of commerce; the chambers and tribunals of commerce applauded
this proposition, but others had voted to maintain the law of revendication, relying principally upon this reason-that one should not
without reason change an usage anciently established in France
and .followed in some foreign countries."
"One may see that the usage of revendication was a source of
litigation, and a means of fraud; that its greatest inconvenience
was, that by the aid of this privilege, the fate of the creditors was
left to the mercy of the bankrupt, at his will to favor the one and
I Dig. 18: 1, 19.

3 Bk. 8, tit. 1,

Domat 3: 1, 5; 4.
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sacrifice the other in preserving or changing the marks which might
constitute the identity, or in retarding or accelerating the sale of
the goods which had been left with him."
"It was on account of these considerations that it has been
decided to permit revendication, only as it is spoken of in our
article 577, and the following."
"=They have hoped by these means to render an essential service
to commerce, to exhaust the source of a crowd of litigations, and
to fulfil the wishes of a majority of the chambers and tribunals of
commerce, whose opinion they have consulted."
In the Code Napoleon,' we find the following ordinance: "The
price of movable effects unpaid, if they are yet in the possession
of the debtor, whether he has bought them on time or without time,
(t terme ou sans terme,) are privileged2 to the vendor."
"Where the sale has been made without time, the vendor may
claim such effects as long as they are in the possession of the buyer
and prevent their resale, provided the reclaim be made within eight
days of the delivery, and the effects be found in the same state in
which such delivery was made."
Thus the right of revendication has been taken away, and the
right of reclaim is limited to eight days.
By the ancient law of. Scotland, all goods not paid for, which
had been received within three days of the period of insolvency,
could be retaken, unless the buyer or his creditors, who succeeded
to his rights, could rebut the general presumption of fraud by
sh6wing that they were obtained with a bong fide intention of paying for them.8 But the modern law, as it exists in England, was
introduced into Scotland by Lord Thurlow, in 1799.4
The right of stoppage in transitu will be found to have existed
in the Italian States,' in Holland,' and in Russia ;7 and it is known
I Bk. 2, tit. 18, ch. 2,
2

2.

"The privilege of a creditor is the distinguishing right which the nature of

his credit gives him to be preferred before
3 1 Bell's Commentaries, 143.
5 Wiseman vs. Vanderput, 2 Vernon, 203.
7 Inglis vs. Usherwood, 1 East, 515;
nance of June 25, 1781, 138.

other creditors." Domat 3: 1, 5; 1.
4 Ibid, Stewart vs. Stein, Dec. 23, 1799.
6 1 11y. B]. 364.
3ohtlink vs. Inglis, 3 East, 381; Ordi.-
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that the old law of France had the same object of protecting the
vendor, although differing widely from the present law of England.
The question of the origin of the law of stoppage in transitu in
England is involved in obscurity. There is no part of the law
more obscure than that connected with the common maxim that the
'lex mercatoria pars est legis requi."'
In the earlier ages the law merchant does -not seem to have been
part of the common law, as it is now; but a concurrent and coexistent law, enforced by the power of the realm, and administered
by its own courts in the staple or in the star chamber. Thus in
1474,2 the Chancellor is represented to have stated his view of the
law thus: "This suit is brought by an alien merchant, who has
come by safe conduct here, and he is not bound to sue by the law
of the land, to abide the trial by twelve men, and other forms of
the law of the land; but he ought to sue him in the star chamber,
and it shall be determined by the law of nature in chancery;" and
he said further, "that a merchant was not bound by the statutes
where the statutes were introductiva novae legis; but if they are
declarativaantiqui jurns, (that is to say of nature,) and since they
have come into the kingdom the king shall have jurisdiction over
them, to administer justice; but that shall be secundem legem
naturae, which is called by some the law merchant, which is the
law universal of the world."
We may safely presume, that at that time the law merchant
was distinct from the common law; and this will account for the
fact, that there is no mention whatever of bills of exchange or
other mercantile forms in the early common law books. 'We are
not thence to suppose that they did not exist; but, that being
adjudged in the courts staple, they were not mentioned in the
books of common law, as at the present day; matters over which
the admiralty or ecclesiastical courts have exclusive jurisdiction
are never treated as part of the common law.
But when the courts of the staple were disused, and the matters
I And perhaps the reader will admit the doctrine of Jleineccius, that "Tu re
obscurt, conjecturas ecqui non iniquum videtur." Elem. Jur. Germ. lib. 1, 164.
213 Edw. 4, 9.

LN TRANSITU.

litigated before them, came into the common law courts, the
principles which governed them were adopted as part of the law
merchant, and began to be mentioned in the books of common
law.
Thus, although the first mention of bills of exchange is in 1603,'
it is well known that they were in common use in the thirteenth
century; and although the right of stoppage in transitu is first
mentioned in 1690, yet it is likely that it was exercised at a much
earlier period.
On the question, whether this right had a legal or equitable
origin, much has been said pro and con; and we shall see that this
was a question of no small importance. Lords Mansfield, Hardevicke, and Loughborough; Justices Heath, Rooke and Grose have
considered it a strictly legal right. But these great names and
opinions to the contrary, notwithstanding, we are convinced that it
is an equitable right, adopted and enforced for the furtherance of
justice by the courts of law, and why ? Because the right is inconsistent with the common law principles of the absolute transfer of
property by sale and delivery. Because, were it a strictly legal
right, in no case could a third party be in a better condition than
the first vendee. Because, if it were, according to Lord Mansfield,
"a part of the general proprietary lien of the seller," it would
follow that he might exercise it at any time while unpaid, at his
mere caprice; thus re-sell upon a rise of the market.
But if it is a merely equitable right adopted by the courts of law,
and on this side we find Lords Kenyon and Stowell; Justices
Buller, Parke, Shaw, and all the American judges who have given
decisions upon the subject,) its application will be confined to the
case of the probability of loss by the insolvency of the vendee;
and again it will only prevail against those who have an inferior
equity, and a bona fide endorsee of a bill of lading will take the
property free from the vendor's right of stoppage.
The diversity of opinion which existed upon this subject may be
considered to have been removed by the case of Lickbarrow vs.
2iason, which bears the same relation to the law of stoppage in
'In the case of Martin vs. Bourne, Cro. Jac. 6.
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transitu, that Coggs vs. Barnard does to the law of common
carriers.
The first case that occurs in the English reports is that of Wiseman vs. T7andepert,' in 1690. In that case the Lord Chancellor
directed an action of trover to be brought by the plaintiffs, in which
they recovered a verdict. But the Lord Chancellor, notwithstanding,
gave a decree against them. By this case it is evident that as
Buller J. says, "so late as 1690 this right or privilege, or whatever
it may be called was unknown at law."
The next case is that of Snee vs. Prescott,2 in 1743. .Here
Lord Hardwicke applied the rule to a certain extent in equity, and
received evidence of what was the custom of merchants ; upon
which equity and evidence he expressly founds his decree.
The next case appears to be that of ex-parte Wilkinson, in 1755,
referred to in D'Aguila vs. Lambert,3 in 1761, in which the Lord
Chancellor again founded his decree upon the usage of merchants.
The case of Liekbarrow vs. lason came before the King's
Bench, in November 1787,' on a demurrer to evidence the court
having decided that by the endorsement and delivery of a bill of
lading for a valuable consideration to a third person, the vendor's
right of stoppage was divested. This judgment was reversed upon
5
a writ of error in the Exchequer, February, 1790, where it was
held that a bill of lading was not a negotiable instrument. This
latter judgment was in turn reversed in the House of Lords, Trinity
term, 33 Geo. 8, 1793 ; and a venire facias de novo directed to be
awarded. To this trial before the house we are indebted for the
elaborate opinion of Buller J. A venire having been awarded, a
special verdict -was found in which the doctrine of the transfer of6
the property by the endorsement of a bill of lading was confirmed
July 1794.
We propose first to state some of the general principles which
12 Vernon, 203.
1 Atk. 245. In 1719, in the case of Atkins vs. Barwick, it was decided that a
factor could not pledge the goods of his consignor, and that a vendee might decline
to receive the goods out of regard to the interests of his vendor. 1 Str. 165.
42 T. R. 63.
3Amb. 399; 2 Eden, 75.
6 5 T. R. 683.
51 H. B. 357.
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govern the right of stoppage in transitu, before entering upon a classification of the cases which have ari~en under this branch of the law.,
The right of stoppage can of course only exist in relation to
personal property, and is founded upon the supposition that the
property has passed to the vendee, and that the possession is in a
third person.2 The contract of sale is not rescinded by the exercise
of this right, and it only enables the vendor to resume his lien for
the security of the price ;3 so that should the vendee tender the
price agreed upon, the'vendor must re-deliver,4 and the vendor even
after having stopped the goods, may maintain an action for the
price being ready to re-deliver; or should he re-sell he may bring
an action for any loss he may sustain.5 The right of stoppage is
paramount to any claim which a third person may have upon the
goods,' and - carrier cannot retain them against the vendor for a
claim due from the vendee; 7 but the vendor upon exercising his
I It

must be kept in mind that by the general law of sale, when the vendor has

given possession, his lien and all his rights in the goods are completely gone, and
the vendee has the absolute, indefeasible and unqualified right of property, even
though lie be insolvent and the price unpaid.
2Liokbarrow vs. Mason, 6 East, 27; Abb. on Sh. 618; St. Jose Indiano, 1 Wheat.
212; Jordon vs. James, 5 Ham. 98.
3In the case of Clay vs. Harrison, 10 B. & C. 99, in 1829, Lord Tenterden remarked, that i, had never been expressly decided whether the stoppage did, or did
not rescind the contract. But in this country in the following cases it has been
held that it did not, but that the parties were placed as nearly as could be in the
same situation, as if the vendor had never parted with his possession. Rowly vs.
Bigelow, 12 Pick. 313 ; Stanton vs. Eager, 16 Pick. 475; Newhall vs. Vargas, 15
Me. 314; Gwynne Exp. 12 Sumner's Ves. 379; 2 Kent, 540 ; Story on Contracts,
517; Ciitty on Contracts, 32 ; Abb. on Sh. 619; Vide et etiam Hodgson vs.Loy,
7 T. R. 44.5; Tucker vs. Humphrey, 4fing. 516; Bloxam vs. Sanders, 4B. & C. 948.
So in Domat 11Venditor quasi pignus retinere potest eam rem quam vendidit."
Bk. 3 tit 1, 5, art 4.
IAbb. on Sh. 619; Jordon vs. James, 5 Ham. 98; 2 Kt. 540; vid post, 47.
6 Kymer vs. Suevereropp, 1 Camp. 109; Abb. on Sh. 620; 2 Kent, 541; Newhall
vs. Vargas, 13 Maine, 93; Brown on Sale, 441.
6 Oppenheim vs. Russell, 3 B. & P., 42; Richardson vs Goss, 3 B. & P., 119;
M1orley vs Hay, 3 I. & Ry., 396.
7 Oppenheimer vs. Russell, 3 B. & P., 42; 2 Kent, 541 ; Morley vs. Hay, 3 M.
Iy., 396
Nor can the carrier retain the goods from the vendee for a debt due from the
vendor. Butler vs. Woolcott, 2 B. & P., 61.
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right must pay any expenses which have rightfully accrued since
they left his possession.' Should the carrier, after notice from the
vendor not to deliver the goods to the vendee, either intentionally
or by mistake deliver them, he is liable in an action brought by the
vendor, and the vendor may yet recover the goods from the vendee.2
"The act of stoppage" says Lord Ellenborough, "should be
done eo intuitu, and adversely to the vendee,"' 3 and the doctrine
on this subject does not apply where the vendor and vendee agree
that the property shall be reclaimed, for then it becomes a question
4
of reconveyance and rescision.
An attachment made by the creditors of the consignee does not
divest the consignor's right of stoppage, that being the prior claim. 5
The right of stoppage in transitu is peculiar to one who stands
in the situation and sustains the character of vendor.
In 1790, Ld. Ch.B. Eyre said, "the right of stopping is out of
the question, that never occurring but as between vendor and
vendee."' In Sweet vs. Pyr,7 it was held that a fuller, having had
a lien upon some cloths, could not stop them in transitu upon the
insolvency of his customer, his lien being lost by delivery. In the
case of Ferze vs. Tfray,5 where Fritzing bought goods in his own
name in Hamburgh for Browne of London, charging B. the original cost with a commission for buying: held, that Browne having
'3 B. & P., 53, Newhall vs. Vargas, 13 Maine, 314; Jordon vs. James, 5 Ham. 98
2
Att vs. Cowley, 7 Taunt. 169; Howatt vs. Davis, 5 Mumford, 34; Abb. on Sh.629.
sSiffkin vs. Wray, 6 East, 371.
Lawes on Charter Parties, 544; Ash vs. Putnam, 1 Hill, 02; Naylor vs.
Dennie, 8 Pick, 198; Long on Sales. 32-5.
6Smith vs. Goff, 1 Camp, 272; Naylor vs. Dennie, 8 Pick., 198 ; Lane vs. Jackson, 5 Mass, 162; Buckley vs. Furniss, 15 Wend., 144; Satte vs. Field, 5 T. R.
211; Conrad vs. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Peters, 386.
6 Kinloch vs. Craig, 3 T. R. 783; Wright vs. Campbell, 4 Burr. 20.50; 2 Kent,
540; Ludlow vs. Browne, 1 Jo. 18.
It is stated by some of the text writers, that the law of stoppage has been applied
in cases of exchange, but we have not succeeded in finding any reported decision.
71 East, 4. But if the goods are put into the bailee's hands, subject to the
bailer's control, there he never parts with the possession, and his lien continues.
Freeman vs. Birch, 1 N. & M. 420.
83 East, 93; vid et etiam Illsley vs. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65; Newhall vs. Vargas,
1 Shep. 93.
4
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become bankrupt, Fritzing might stop the goods, being in fact the
vendor. In the subsequent case, of Siffkin vs. Wray,l Fritzing
being merely surety for the price, was held to have no right to stop
them. Lord Ellenborough said, "Fritzing's situation in this transaction was very different from what it was in Perze vs. Tray;
there he was liable in the first instance for the price of the goods, and
therefore the court considered him as a vendor quoad the bankrupt."
A consignor, having shipped goods on joint account of consignor
and consignee, may stop the goods upon the insolvency of the consignee.2 So an alien enemy, trading under a license, was held
entitled to exercise this right, the license giving legality to all the
consequences of the sale.'
Where goods are shipped to meet liabilities on the part of the
consignee, or in payment of a precedent debt, the consignor cannot
stop them ;4 nor after the bill of lading is signed can the property
be divested from the consignee by any change of papers ;5 for the
goods are of the nature of a pledge, and the consignor a pledgor, and
not a vendor. But, although the consignee be a creditor, if the goods
are shipped for and on account of the consignor, he can stop them.'
The right of stoppage can only be exercised when the vendor is
wholly or partially unpaid.
As the paid vendor has no need, so he has no right to stop the
goods. But in 1797, a doubt existed as to the vendor's right to
stop the goods when he was partially paid. This doubt was dispelled by the case of .odgson vs. Loy,7 the judges being "clearly
of opinion, that the vendee's, having partially paid for the goods,
does not defeat the vendor's right to stop them in transitu."
1 6 East, 371.

2 Newsonr vs. Thornton, 6 East, 17.

- Fenton vs. Pearson, 15 East, 419.
4Vertue vs. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31; Wood vs. Roach, 2 Dall. 180; Walters vs.
Ross, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 283; Smith vs. Rowles, 2 Esp. 578; Patten vs. Thompson, 5
M. & S. 356; Tookes vs. Hollingsworth, 5 T. R. 215; Haille vs. Smith, 1 B. &P. 563.
5 Summerell vs. Elder, 1 Binn. 106; Ryberg vs. Snell, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 294.
6 Walters vs. Ross, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 283; Ryberg vs. Snell, 2 Wash. Cir. R.
294-403.
77 T. R. 440; Edwards vs. Brewer, 2 M. & S. 375; Newhall vs. Vargas, 13
Maine, 93; 2 Kent, 541; 15 Maine, 314; Wood vs. Roach, 2 Dall. 180; Jordon
vs. James, 5 Ham. 88.
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Neither bills of exchange, nor notes, nor securities, nor acceptances are payment, unless expressly so considered.'
"There is
great difference," says Ashurst, J., "between payment and the
liability to pay. Unpaid liabilities do not take away the right of
stoppage. "2 Neither does the fact, that the goods were sold on
time, not yet expired, compel the vendor to await the expiration of
the time; for that, in most cases, would be the same as depriving
him of his right.' Where the vendor has negotiated the bills
received in payment, and is no longer liable on them, he is of
course paid;" so where the debtor consignor ships goods to his
creditor consignee, there can be no doubt as to payment. 5
In Bell vs. .oss, 6 the consignors were held not to have lost their
right by a general right given by the consignees to draw on a third
party, such third party having given notice, that they should not
meet the demand. But if the vendor takes the acceptance of a
third party, it would seem that he has no right to stop the goods
until he is likely to lose by the insolvency of such third party.
The right of stoppage must be exercised before the property
comes into the actual or constructive possession of the vendee or of
those who represent him.
Much of the difficulty, we apprehend, which has arisen in deciding whether the right of stoppage was lost or still remained in the
vendor, has been caused by the equivocal meaning of the words
possession 7 and delivery.
In common parlance, he is said to be possessed who has the property in his actual possession, whether be has the ownership or not.
In general legal language a person is said to be possessed when
1 Owensou vs. Morse, 7 T. R. 64; Pucford vs. Maxwell, 6 T. R. 54; Patten
vs. Thompson, 5 M. & S. 350; Edwards vs. Brewer, 2 M. & W. 375; Newhall vs.
Vargas, 13 Maine, 93.
2 Kinloch vs. Craig, 3 T. R.122; Whitaker on Lien, p. 163.
3 Fergevs. Wray, 3 East, 93; Bohtlink vs. Inglis, 3 East, 381 ; Inglisvs. Usherwood, 1 East, 515; Ilisley vs. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65; Stubbs vs. Lund, 7 Mass. 453.
4Walter vs. Ross, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 283.
6 5 Wharton, 169.
5Bunney vs. Poynty, 4 B. & Ad. 568.
"Possessio appellata est, ut et Labeo ait, a pedibus quasi possessio; quia
naturaliter tenetur ab eo, qui ei insistit: quam Graci z'rxvy dicunt."-Mackeldey's

Comp. of Civil Law, 1, 1, 1.
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he owns the property, in whosoever hands it may be. In the language of the law of stoppage in transitu, a transferree is said to
be possessed, when the transferror has changed his character of
vendor, for that of bailee; or the property having passed from the
possession of the vendor, the transferree has exercised some act of
ownership or control over it, or it has come into his actual possession.
Delivery is of two kinds,' actual and constructive, and the distinction between these two kinds has been supposed by some writers
to furnish the true criterion required to regulate the exercise of the
law of stoppage in transitu.
Actual delivery we consider to consist in giving real possession
of the thing sold to the vendee, or to those who are identified with
him in law, his servants, special agents, or assignees.
Constructive delivery is a general term comprehending all those
acts, which, though not conferring real possession, yet have been
held constructione jtris equivalent to acts of real delivery. In
this are included all those traditiones fictae which have been considered sufficient to vest the absolute property in the vendee, and
bar the rights of lien and stoppage in transitu, such as marking,
charging with rent, setting apart, giving delivery order, &c.
Previous to the sale, the property is in the vendor, and the
possession actually his, or in the hands of some one holding in his
behalf; by the completion of the bargain, the property is transferred to the vendee;' then some act must follow to constitute the
delivery; should the vendor give the vendee the key of the warehouse in which the goods are stored, 3 or consent to keep them at
rent,4 or gratuitously 5 for the vendee, or give him a delivery order 6
for them, or transfer to him any documents indicative of the ownerBy the Roman law, also, delivery was of two kinds, traditio vera, de manu in
manum, which gave actual possession; and traditio ficta, constructive delivery,
which was held constructione juris, equivalent to real delivery.
2 So in the French law, vide Code Napoleon, No. 1583.
s Wilkes vs. Ferris, 5 John, 335; Ellis vs. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464: Dictum of Lord
Kenyon; Copland vs. Stein, 8 T. R. 199.
Hurry vs. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452.
5 Barrett vs. Goddard, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 107.
6 Wilkes vs. Ferris, 5 Johns. 335; Hollingsworth vs. Napier, 3 Caines 182.
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ship," these acts would constitute a constructive delivery; but
should the vendee carry away the goods, or should the vendor put
them into the vendee's warehouse, or on board his vessel, then they
are actually delivered ; but in either case the vendor's lien and
right to stop them are gone.
By the completion of the bargain, although the property rests
in the vendee, yet if it is actually in the hands of the vendor's
agent, it is not delivered until that agent holds it in behalf of the
vendee, for the privity of contract between the vendor and agent
does not also pass with the property. Thus the important question, where the property is not moved, is, in what character does
the bailee hold the goods ? Only while the goods are in transitu
may they be stopped; and hence another question arises: When
are the goods in transitu, or, when has that transitus ceased ?
2
It was formerly held by Lord Mansfield, in Hunter vs. Beale,
that the goods must come to the "corporal tolch" of the vendee ;
but in Wright vs. Lawes, ' he said, "I wish that expression had
never been used, as it says too much; all that is necessary, is that
the consignee should exercise some act of ownership over the property." And in Dixon vs. Baldwin,' Lord Ellenborough, alluding
to Biunter vs. Beale, said, "that is a figurative expression, and
rarely, if ever strictly true."
Let us first notice that class of cases in which the vendor's
possession ends and the vendee's begins, where there is no transitus. The principles by which they are governed are precisely
the same as in cases of stoppage in transitu, so that they are sometimes inaccurately classed with them.
In all these cases it must be clearly proved that the vendor has consented to give up his claim as vendor and become bailee for the vendee.
Thus in Stoveld vs. .Huges,5 H. sold D. & Co. timber lying on
H.'s wharf, upon which D. & Co.'s mark was put and payment
made by a bill for three months. D. & Co. sold the timber before
the maturity of the bill to S. H. was informed of the resale and
said "very well ;" showed S. the timber, and assisted in changing
1 Hollingsworth vs. Napier, 3 Caines, 182.
34 Esp. 82.

4 6 East, 184.

2 3 T. R. 466.
5 14 East, 316.
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the marks. S. paid D. &Co., but D. & Co. failed, and H. claimed to
retain the timber from S. Held by the court, that H. had consented to
become the bailee of D. & Co., and that the timber had been delivered.
In the case of Hurry vs. Mangles,' Lord Ellenlorough said:
"The acceptance of warehouse rent was a complete transfer of the
goods to the purchaser. If I pay for part of a warehouse, so much
of it is mine. The goods were transferred to the person who paid
the rent, as much as if they had been removed to his own warehouse and there deposited under lock and key.'" The subsequent
case, of Miles vs. Gorton 2 is founded upon a false statement of the
facts in Hurry vs. Mangles, and is opposed to it.
In the case of Elmore vs. Stone 3 the vendor having sold a pair
of horses, removed them from his sale stable, and kept them at
livery for the vendee. Held, that this was sufficient delivery.
In the case of Harman vs. Anderson,4 the vendee received a
delivery order which he gave to the wharfingers holding the goods,
who thereupon transferred them to his name in their books and
debited him with the rent; and although one parcel was transferred, Lord Ellenborough held "that after the delivery order was
given to the wharfingers, they were bound to hold the goods on
account of the purchasers." From thenceforward they became the
agents of the vendee, and between the vendor and the vendee the
delivery was complete and the right of stoppage gone."
But it is necessary in all cases, that the bailee should consent to
hold the goods for the vendee; as in the case Lackington vs. Atherton," the bailee having refused so to do, and the vendee subsequently
failing, it was held, that the vendor's right was not divested. 6
As a general rule of law, an authority may be revoked at any
time before its execution; but where the authority is bought for a
1 1 Camp. 452; vide et etam, Anderson vs. Scott, 1 Camp. 235 ; Hodgson vs.

Le Bet, 1 Camp. 233.
In 1834, 2 C. & M. 504.
s 1 Taunt. 458.
2 Camp. 243; 1 N. R. 69, vide Lucas v. Donien, 7 Taunt. 278.
51 Scott N. S. 38.
6 In Allen vs. Mercier, 1 Ashmead, 103, the carrier refused to deliver to the
vendee until he paid the balance due; the goods having been demanded by the
vendee, but remaining in the carrier's hands, it was held that the vendor's right was
not divested.
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consideration, and coupled with an interest, it is both transferable
Should the consideration fail, the giver may
and irrevocable.
revoke the authority, provided it is not executed. Thus, after the
vendor has given an authority to the vendee to receive the goods
from the bailee, and before that authority has been communicated
to the bailee, it would seem that the vendor would have a right to
revoke it upon the failure of the consideration upon which it is
founded. But if the authority has been communicated to the
bailee, and he hat changed from vendor's to vendee's bailee, the
property and possession have both completely passed.
There is another class of cases, although they do not come strictly
within the scope of our subject, yet as they have been classed under
the head of stoppage in transitu, we shall notice them here. 1 They
are those in which some act of weighing, measuring, or counting
remains to be performed before or after the sale. The general rule
is, that where any such act remains to be performed in order to
ascertain the price, quantity, or individuality of the article to be
delivered, or to put it in a deliverable state, the contract is not
2
complete until such operation is performed.
Thus in the case of Rugg vs. Minott,3 some casks of turpentine
were sold which were to be filled up before delivery; a part were
I These cases have probably been classed with those of stoppage in trausitu, because
the goods being in the hands of some third person, the vendor has endeavored to
resume his lien upon them for the price. For even after giving a delivery order,
or actual possession, the contract may yet be incomplete from the existence of a suspensive condition. Lucy vs. Burdy, 9 N. H. 298; Mitchel vs. Ede, 3 P. & D. 513.
2 Vide Brown on Sale, 45. This rule was recognized by Wilde, J., in Macomber
,In
vs. Parker, 13 Pick. 175 ; by Denny, J., in Riddle vs. Varnum,'20 Pick 280.

his quae pondere, numero, mensurave constant, (veluti frumento, vine, oleo,
argento,) modo ea servantur, quae in caeteris, ut simul atque de pretio convenerit,

non tamen aliter videatur perfeota venditis, quiam si admensa, adpensa adnumeratare sint.

Nam si one vinum, vel oleum, vel frumentum, vel argentum, quantum

cunque esset, uno pretio venderit, idem juris est, quod in caeteris rebus."-Domat
on Sale, 1, 2, 5, 7.

Code Napoleon, No. 1585; Simmond vs. Swift, 5 B. & C. 857; Rapelye vs. Mackie,
6 Cow. 250; Outwater vs. Dodge, 7 Cow. 35; Logan vs. LeMesurier, Lond. Jurist
for 1847, p. 1091. Lord Brougham says: "Now, to constitute a sale which shall
immediately pass the property, it is necessary that the thing sold should be ascertained, and that there should be a price ascertained or ascertainable."
3 11 East, 210; vide et etiam Ward vs. Shaw, 7 Mud. 404.

